

Question	Your response
Question 1: How do you measure the number of users on your service?	Confidential? – N
	The Wikimedia Foundation is a non-profit or- ganisation that hosts several <u>free knowledge pro-</u> <u>jects</u> , the largest of which is Wikipedia. Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia, is a collaborative project created and maintained in over 300 languages by volunteers across the globe. The community of vol- unteers, who comprise the global Wikimedia Move- ment, collaboratively write and edit the content of the encyclopaedia.
	Our policies and practices regarding user data and metrics prioritise security and privacy, by design. We do not require users to log in, and we do not prevent users from having multiple accounts. Accordingly, we cannot generate direct statistics about the number of users on our sites. Instead, we attempt to count unique <i>devices</i> visiting the sites. In some cases, one device = one user; but since a family can share a tablet PC, while single adults can use multiple devices at home (and more at work), that 1:1 equivalence is unlikely to hold true, gener-
	ally. In line with our data minimization principles, we <u>comply with the EU Digital Services Act (DSA)'s</u> <u>requirement to publish an average number of</u> <u>monthly "active," "unique" human users</u> by estimat- ing it, using the existing data collected about visits
	to our sites—namely, <u>unique device counts</u> . We convert unique device data to an estimated unique user count by dividing it (currently) by 2.4, which a survey by Cisco suggests is an approximate number of devices per capita for internet users. In other words, we use third party survey data to estimate
	that an "average" human accessing Wikipedia, in a

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	given month, does so using 2.4 unique devices
	(phone, laptop, work devices, "Alexa"-type home as-
	sistants, their usual browser's "private"/"anonymous"
	sessions, etc). As updated survey data emerges,
	this conversion factor can be updated, to match
	evolving trends in internet usage.
	For more information about our Unique De-
	vice counting methodology—including how we at-
	tempt to discount bots—see <u>here</u> , <u>here</u> ; see also
	our Privacy Policy and our New User Welcome Sur-
	vey Privacy Statement. Our conversion of that into
	usercount data, for DSA categorisation purposes, is
	described <u>here</u> .
	This approach, which preserves privacy
	while providing the relevant regulators with suffi-
	ciently reliable and detailed information to appropri-
	ately categorise our platform for DSA purposes, was
	vetted and approved by the European Commission.
	It is vital, both for privacy and resourcing sus-
	tainability purposes, that the UK accepts this ap-
	proach.
	Our firm commitment to protect the privacy
	of our large international user base is necessary so
	that volunteers and readers alike can trust that they
	will not be tracked in their activities on Wikimedia
	platforms. This is further supported by international
	human rights standards, which stipulate that states
	have a duty to protect children's right to form and
	express their opinions without interference from au-
	tomated processes of information filtering and profil-
	ing (See <u>Human Rights Policy</u>).

Your response

Question 2: If your service comprises a part on which user-generated content is present and a part on which such content is not present, are you able to distinguish between users of these different parts of the service? If so, how do you make that distinction (including over a given period of time)? Confidential? – N

With the exception of "special" pages (like the platform <u>Terms of Use</u> or <u>Privacy Policy</u>, or system-generated pages like an "Article history", which just lists edits made to an article), and also with the exception of on-wiki messages posted by Wikimedia Foundation staff members (e.g. in response to questions from the public), the content on Wikipedia is *all* user-generated content. That content, and community discussions about it, as well as edits or changes to improve such encyclopaedic content, are publicly-viewable by anyone who visits the site. This is how the platform was designed from its inception more than twenty years ago.

Every article has a <u>"history"</u> section, which indicates what changes have been made and who has made those changes, and a <u>"discussion"</u> section, where users can discuss changes they want to make before hitting "edit." These basic safeguards build accountability into the editing process and put content moderation tools and processes in the hands of the entire community.

Such "user-generated" and non "user-generated" content is highly intermingled. On a page like <u>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Fundrais-</u> ing/2023_banners, for instance, there are messages — even, potentially, *parts of sentences* that have been posted/modified by both Wikimedia Foundation staff (i.e. not "users", but rather, staff of the web host), and ordinary users. Differentiating the two would be artificial, and practically impossible. The English language Wikipedia alone contains 6.4 million articles and approximately 555 are added *per day*.

Your response

Question 3: Do you measure different segments of users on your service?

- Do you segment user measurement by different parts of your service? For example, by website vs app, by product, business unit.
- Do you segment user measurement into different types of users? For example: creators, accounts holders, active users.
- How much flexibility does your user measurement system have to define new or custom segments?

Confidential? – N

As previously mentioned, we do not directly measure different segments of users of the various language editions of Wikipedia. Anyone can read Wikipedia, and even edit some articles, without creating an account. We do not require that users create an account to use Wikipedia; even if they create one (or more than one), they do not have to login to them. As for unregistered or logged-out users, we cannot uniquely identify which one is a particular person. Accordingly, we cannot measure or segment "users", i.e. individual people across platforms and devices. Instead, we base our measurements (and segmentation) on the unique devices that access the platform. To do so, since 2016, we use a Last-Access cookie to track the number of unique devices per domain (e.g. en.m.wikipedia.org) and per project (e.g. Wikipedia), and can separate devices by country (see, for example, our userbase statistics for EU-based users of the Wikimedia projects as required under the DSA.

There are limitations to this approach: we are not able to identify users from the data passed in the cookie—the cookie contains only a year, month, and day. With unique device counts, if a user visits the desktop and mobile sites, that user's devices would be counted twice. Moreover, device geolocation is generally inaccurate—for example, some users may be using Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) in order to avoid local surveillance and/or censorship. It is worth noting that the European Commission does not require us to increase the amount of data collected about our users in order to comply with the DSA.

Do you segment user measurements by different parts of your service? For example, by website vs app, by product, business unit

Your response

As previously mentioned, we utilise the unique device counts to extrapolate the number of active users based on project and, when possible, country/region. We further segment by which app version a mobile device user accesses the sites through (namely, iOS and Android). For reference: in 2022, there were approximately 1.4M monthly active users on the Wikipedia iOS app and 4.5M on the Wikipedia Android app, globally.

We measure pageviews and article edits, as well, and further segment those into different categories. For example, monthly pageview metrics are segmented by domain: mobile pageviews are counted using the mobile domain (e.g., en.m.wikipedia.org); Desktop pageviews are counted using the desktop domain (e.g., en.wikipedia.org; cy.wikipedia.org).

We also segment pageviews, edits, and unique devices by which of the 300 language versions of Wikipedia is accessed. UK readers regularly access language versions of Wikipedia *other than English*, including: <u>Chinese</u> (6M UK pageviews monthly); <u>French</u> (3M UK pageviews monthly); <u>Polish</u> (3M UK pageviews monthly); <u>Persian</u> (2M UK pageviews monthly); <u>Arabic</u> (1M UK pageviews monthly); <u>Welsh</u> (90K UK pageviews monthly); <u>Urdu</u> (41K UK pageviews monthly); <u>Irish</u> (12K UK pageviews monthly); <u>Scottish gaelic</u> (10K UK pageviews monthly); <u>Breton</u> (9K UK pageviews monthly); <u>Manx</u> (4K UK pageviews monthly). Together, these figures represent over 15M pageviews *per month* by UK readers.

As highlighted by Lord Moylan and others throughout the OSB's journey through the House of Lords, Welsh Wikipedia is the largest Welsh-language website in the world, and would be in danger of vanishing entirely if Wikipedia becomes inaccessible in the UK (See Lord Moylan's comments in

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	support of an amendment seeking to exempt Wik- ipedia from the OSB). Welsh Wikipedia is viewed over 7.5 million times every month, and is now part of the secondary curriculum in Wales, within a mod- ule of the Welsh Baccalaureate.
	Do you segment user measurement into different types of users? For example: creators, account holders, active users. As outlined above, we segment device/ac- count (<i>not</i> user) measurement into different catego- ries for different purposes, including editors (see active editors of English Wikipedia by country), anonymous editors, and anonymous users. We do the same to measure bot activity (e.g., bot editors; articles edited by bot editors — note: these are usu- ally community moderator-created bots that perform simple tasks, e.g. typo corrections or undoing basic vandalism).
	We further measure certain categories of reg- istered accounts with enhanced enforcement pow- ers, including <u>"administrators"</u> and <u>"bureaucrats"</u> . These experienced volunteer editors, selected by the broader community of volunteer editors, have the ability to block or unblock accounts, temporarily protect pages from being edited, and delete pages entirely. These users have registered accounts and utilise those accounts to access as well as take ac- tions on articles. How much flexibility does your user
	measurement system have to define new or cus- tom segments?
	The only way to track and count unique us- ers, as opposed to devices, would be if we required

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everyone to login to use wiki projects, and to provide information about their true identities (presently, editors who wish to protect their identities for whatever reason, including concerns about harassment and other physical threats can create user profiles using pseudonyms, and are not required to offer information that could be used to identify them offline). As previously stated, collecting more information about user and editor identities would not only go against our long standing commitments to our volunteer community and the prioritisation of user privacy and security; the community would resist such changes.

If the Foundation is forced to collect new types of data about users, this would likely result in the loss of some of Wikipedia's most important and active contributors, editors and admins, including those from the UK who cannot see the sense of, for example, proving their age and putting up with Foundation-imposed measures, just to carry on doing what they have successfully done - as volunteers, and through no duty to anyone - for *over two decades*.

Our stance on privacy, when it comes to analytics, also links to some of our much wider concerns about this Bill, notably around privacy, and barriers to learning and exploration.

For instance, forcing Wikipedia to institute age verification and/or requiring every individual who wants to read or otherwise access the information on Wikipedia to create and log-into an account would jeopardise the functionality of these services and, more broadly, the availability and quality of neutral, well-sourced information across the internet ecosystem.

There are many services that rely on knowledge from Wikipedia to serve vital information to their users. This includes search services like

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	Google, Bing, and DuckDuckGo; virtual assistants like Apple's Siri and Amazon's Alexa; and <u>ChatGPT</u> . We can reasonably expect that most peo- ple as well as information aggregation services will instead turn to other sources of information that are not age-gated. Their information diet will be — for instance — a tabloid website, or a free (and likely tampered-with, or advertising-laden) Wik- ipedia clone hosted by an unknown entity. (A web- site that re-publishes Wikipedia content — and worse still, tampers with it — but cannot be edited by users, falls outside the scope of this Bill.)
Question 4: Do you publish any infor- mation about the number of users on your service?	Confidential? – N Yes. Many of these metrics are published on publicly-available sites like <u>Wikimedia Statistics</u> (aka WikiStats). We also publish data related to requests to alter or takedown content and user data requests from authorities, divided by country, in our bi-annual <u>Transparency Reports</u> ; in line with DSA require- ments, we will in future be adding (for Wikipedia, only - not our smaller projects) our estimated active monthly user counts, at national level (the DSA re- quires the data to be broken down by EU country, for Very Large Online Platforms). This will comple- ment our existing DSA (estimated) userdata publica- tion, here: <u>https://foundation.wikimedia.org/wiki/Le- gal:EU_DSA_Userbase_Statistics</u>
Question 5: Do you contribute any user number data to external sources/databases, or help industry measurements systems by tagging or sharing user measurement data? If not, what prevents you from doing so?	Confidential? – N No. We are a nonprofit that lacks the resources and staffing necessary to build out systems to contribute to further databases.

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Question 6: Do you have evidence of functionalities that may affect how easily, quickly and widely content is disseminated on U2U services?	Confidential? – N
	Are there particular functionalities that enable content to be disseminated widely on U2U services?
 Are there particular functionalities that enable content to be disseminated easily on U2U services? Are there particular functionalities that enable content to be disseminated quickly on U2U services? Are there particular functionalities that enable content to be disseminated widely on U2U services? Are there particular functionalities that enable content to be disseminated widely on U2U services? Are there particular functionalities that enable content to be disseminated widely on U2U services? 	Algorithmic Amplification The Wikimedia projects are structured and governed in a way that does not allow content to spread virally on the projects, limiting the threat of such content being widely viewed. In the case of Wikipedia, since Wikipedia is organised around a singular goal, the construction and maintenance of an online encyclopaedia, the factual information posted by users is not the type that goes viral. <u>Recommendation Systems</u> Wikipedia <i>does</i> have limited recommendation features including, for example, featured (commu-
 Are there particular function- alities that prevent content from being easily, quickly and widely disseminated on U2U services? 	nity selected) "article of the day" and "on this day in history."
	There are recommendation/sharing-like features that are specific to the mobile browser and app in- terfaces, namely:
	 "Related Articles" links at the bottom of an article; "Explore" feed on the mobile apps is constantly updated and can be customised to the user's interests; "Most read" lists on the mobile apps; "Share this article" widget on the mobile apps so on-app links can be shared easily on other applications.
	Features such as these should not automati- cally be Category 1 or 2B triggers; they are ex- tremely commonplace. Instead, functionality-based categorization criteria should also ask:

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	1. What purpose does it serve, and what sort of
	content does it share (in Wikipedia's case, it
	is merely to spark intellectual curiosity, and
	aid discoverability of encyclopaedic content);
	2. Is it neutral/contextual (based on relevance
	to the context the user is in), or is biased in
	some fashion, e.g.
	a) Intimately tailored to the
	user/usergroup demographics; and/or
	b) Manipulated in order to push certain
	types of content (paid placement, po-
	litical messaging, highly sophisticated
	addiction/engagement tailoring)?
	3. Has it been made core to the user experience,
	design, etc, or merely ancillary (as can be seen on a
	page like <u>https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Mar-</u> rakesh-Safi_earthquake, someone would have to
	scroll extensively before seeing the "Related Arti-
	cles" box).
	Are there particular functionalities that prevent content from being easily, quickly and widely disseminated on U2U services?
	Human Editors
	The Wikimedia Movement's approach to ad-
	dressing potentially harmful or illegal content has
	been tailored over years of community and organi-
	sational practice to promote fairness and minimise
	harm. This necessarily involves close collaboration
	between volunteer moderators and professional
	trust and safety staff. The Wikimedia volunteer com-
	munity also enforces project-specific policies which
	address illegal content, like these from English Wik-
	ipedia.
	The Wikimedia community is already highly
	effective at removing illegal and harmful content on
	the projects. Researchers at the Berkman Klein

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Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University found that the median amount of time harmful content remained on English language Wikipedia was 61 seconds. They found that Wikipedia's system of identifying and removing harmful content is largely effective, despite Wikipedia's large scale, the variety of content, and different interpretations of the Wikimedia Foundation's guidelines and policies.

There are certain situations which cannot be handled by volunteers and are escalated to the Wikimedia Foundation Trust & Safety <u>emergency</u> <u>response team</u> to address. This includes situations where there is a threat of serious harm to someone's physical safety, as well as some higher level conduct issues which require a full,confidential investigation. This type of escalation is possible because of the trusted relationship between the Foundation and the volunteer administrators who maintain the Wikimedia projects.

Automated Tools to Support Human Editors

Editors on Wikipedia employ a multi-layered approach to discovering and removing harmful speech on the projects. The Foundation seeks to empower users to participate in content moderation processes by, for example, providing them access to machine learning tools which they can use to improve or quickly remove content. While the Foundation may assist developers with building tools, they are used and maintained by community members.

One of the tools editors can use is ClueBot NG, an automated tool which uses a combination of different machine learning detection methods and requires a high confidence level to automatically remove vandalism on the projects. Another tool is a machine learning tool called <u>Objective Revision</u> <u>Evaluation Service (ORES)</u> which assigns scores to

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	edits and articles in order to help human editors improve articles. Additionally, users with special privileges have access to the <u>AbuseFilter</u> extensions, which allows them to set specific controls and create automated reactions for certain behaviours. While automated tools are used to support existing community moderation processes, the bulk of the work is still done <u>manually</u> .
Question 7: Do you have evidence re- lating to the relationship between user numbers, functionalities and how easily, quickly and widely con- tent is disseminated on U2U services?	Confidential? – N When considering which functionalities are relevant to setting categorisation thresholds, Ofcom should take into account that the types of content hosted by a platform for particular purposes—like a collaboratively-maintained online encyclopaedia with policies that require information to be neutrally- presented and well-sourced. The functionality and safety features that are employed on Wikipedia and the other Wikimedia projects are designed to serve the specific user communities that build and maintain them. The pro- jects attract different user bases and are centred around different types of content (images on Wiki- media Commons, for example). We have found that the larger the userbase, the safer the projects usually are from proliferation of content that is not welcome or does not belong on the platform. The maintenance work required for Wikipedia or Commons, for example, relies on multi- ple volunteer users. The larger volunteer userbase contributes to a greater diversity of voices in the all- important discussions regarding particular content and seeking consensus regarding what actions are to be taken, and related project policies. Forcing changes on collaboratively-main- tained projects will necessarily dissuade volunteer

Question	Your response
	participation, thereby reducing the number of users monitoring pages, negatively impacting the commu- nity's ability to effectively moderate content on the
	platform, and decreasing the diversity of voices among the volunteer userbase.
Question 8: Do you have evidence of other objective and measurable fac- tors or characteristics that may be relevant to category 1 threshold con- ditions?	Confidential? – N <u>Summary:</u> In addition to user numbers and function- alities, Ofcom <i>must</i> consider the following in all of its categorisation criteria: the platform's mission (public interest v.s. profit); governance model (bottom-up, community governance v.s. top-down, centralised); resourcing and sustainability.
	User base A one-size-fits-all approach for setting Cate- gory 1 threshold conditions based on a platform's user numbers or reach <i>without regard to its specific</i> <i>purpose and operations</i> would risk over-regulation of legal and less harmful content. This approach creates a substantial risk that platforms with high visitor numbers and well-established policies <i>and</i> practices that govern user behaviour and content moderation—-like Wikipedia—-would be placed in an inappropriate category and face outsized regula- tion relative to their risk level. As previously stated, altering our policies and the functionality of the Wikimedia projects by forcing all users to create and log-into accounts would not only go against our longstanding commit- ments to and prioritisation of user privacy and secu- rity, but would risk destroying our governance model via decimation of our user communities. This would likely mean the loss of some of Wikipedia's most im- portant and active contributors, editors and admins, who are critical to the operation and continuation of the projects.

Your response

What is worse, if a legislative precedent is established that forces us to collect such data about UK users, we can expect that many other governments around the world will impose similar requirements in ways that will seriously expose our community to security and human rights risks. Such increased personal data collection and processing would present an unacceptable security risk, but particularly those in parts of the world that *truly* need Wikipedia and rely on safe and secure ways to access it.

Sustainability and mission

The obligations imposed under the OSB on nonprofit, public interest platforms with decentralised, volunteer-run content moderation models like Wikipedia *should be* different from those required of for-profit platforms that have top-down, centrally-directed content moderation systems that support advertising-driven business models.

Platforms like Wikipedia, which are not-forprofit, face unique regulatory challenges, which are only exacerbated when categorisation thresholds lack nuance and set the same requirements and expectations for all platforms with a certain number of users.

Unlike profit-oriented platforms, Wikimedia projects provide information to individuals *without* exploiting their data, attention, or targeting them with ads. Platforms that do not derive revenue from advertising or based on the number of 'clicks' on their content do not have the same incentives as commercial platforms to push potentially harmful content to users, whether through algorithmic recommendations or otherwise.

Your response

Also, the Wikimedia projects pursue the public interest; more specifically, they empower everyday citizens to determine the inclusion, presentation and prominence of content. There is no commercial or political incentive for the Wikimedia Foundation to promote some of that content (e.g. to accept paid political advertising in order to maximise investor returns).

A categorisation scheme that does not recognize and account for these factors would improperly place Wikipedia in the same tier as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter, based almost entirely on user numbers, and risk destroying Wikipedia's sustainability.

Categorisation criteria could for instance ask for evidence of nonprofit status, for example (in our case) proof of "501(c)(3)" (non-profit) status under US law. It could also look at advertising revenue (as a proxy for attention/virality-based business models which could be at higher risk of problematic content amplification, misplaced incentives around content moderation policy, etc.).

Alternatively, or in addition, criteria could examine an organisation's legally-enshrined objectives/purpose, as documented (usually) in its founding documents (Articles of Incorporation, charter, etc.).

It has previously been suggested, including during the Bill's Lords Report stage and by a vast diversity of signatories to <u>this Open Letter</u>, that organisations with a *public interest* mission, whose services are "*provided for the purpose of indexing*, *curating*, *adapting*, *analysing*, *discussing or making available content in the public interest, including but not limited to historical*, *academic*, *artistic*, *educational*, *encyclopaedic*, *journalistic*, *or statistical content*", deserve protection from the Bill's excesses. We concur, and therefore suggest that if

Your response

those services are not added to Schedule 1 (and thus spared the Bill's general burdens and risks), then at the very least such a purpose/mission should be recognised in questions relating to categorisation. (And as noted <u>here</u>, "public interest" is a recognised UK legal concept, allowing Ofcom to rely on that existing caselaw, if there were questions about an organisation's true nature).

Volunteer-driven content governance model

The communities who build Wikipedia, for instance, collaborate to effectively and swiftly remove content that runs counter to the purpose of writing a fact-based, well-sourced encyclopaedia article, or does not otherwise meet high quality standards. Wikipedia's successful model of community collaboration and deliberation empowers volunteers to consider the context and sourcing of every sentence, data point, or image. This allows them to make nuanced and thoughtful decisions, and to avoid the mistakes and over-censorship common to the automated flagging and removal processes used for content moderation by many commercial platforms.

New obligations on the platform host (the Wikimedia Foundation) to monitor, automatically remove, block or filter certain content, or to respond to complaints within timeframes so short that they prevent meaningful community decision-making are not compatible with community governance models like Wikipedia's. A duty to reliably shield users (adults or children) from accessing certain content could be seen - particularly in the face of occasional moral outrages, political pressure, and/or ill-considered judicial precedent) as a duty to monitor every piece of information that is uploaded to a platform, or even

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changes to specific sentences in an article, and review the content with regard to its potentially illegal nature (under highly specific UK legal criteria) or harmful effects. As such it is detrimental to the way that volunteers on Wikipedia can make responsible decisions together without the Foundation interfering in those established processes.

Category 1 status would also require a site like Wikipedia to allow UK users to "prevent nonverified users from interacting with content which that user generates, uploads or shares on the service" (Clause 15(9) and 15(10)(b)). There does not appear to be any carveout for "interaction" consisting of community moderation. In essence, this would mean that all users - even administrators, and the "arbitration committee" members who can review their actions - would have to submit to identity verification before they can do *anything* - even read - content posted or edited by those UK users. The vast majority of Wikipedia users, admins, arbitrators, etc, could either refuse or be unable to reliably verify their identity to continue doing something they have reliably done for over two decades. If assigned to Category 1 status, Wikipedia would be made essentially powerless to continue as a community-moderated endeavour, worldwide, in order to serve a UK audience. It is critical, therefore, that Category 1 criteria exclude sites where moderation is substantially dependent on content "interactions" by other users (in the sense of clause 15(10)(b)).

The existence, or not, of meaningful community-based moderation is generally objectively visible in and of itself. If it *also* had to be *measured*, then categorization criteria could for instance compare (i.e. measure a ratio of) moderation actions taken by the website host (in our case, the Wikimedia Foundation) versus moderation-type actions taken by the userbase.

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	Other Systems & Processes
	Other Systems & Processes
	Existing policies and practices to evaluate, mitigate
	risks and harms
	Platforms that have effective policies and
	practices to mitigate risks and harms potentially
	posed by U2U content, and to protect the funda-
	mental rights of their users—-implemented prior to
	the enactment of any legal mandate to do so—
	should be recognized as inherently lower-risk, and
	thus more disproportionately affected by Category 1
	status.
	For example, the Wikimedia Foundation has
	conducted multiple impact assessments to identify
	and evaluate human rights risks related to the Wiki-
	media projects, as well as opportunities to address
	and mitigate those risks (see <u>Human Rights Impact</u>
	Assessment (HRIA); HRIA Report (2020); Child
	Rights Impact Assessment (CRIA) to be published
	later this year).
	A further objective and measurable criterion
	could be whether the platforms are already regu-
	lated under the EU DSA <u>and</u> are generally imple-
	menting the requisite online safety measures in a
	geographically universal way. Provided that the UK
	also benefits from those compliance actions, the
	platform's risk (from a UK perspective) can also
	generally be assumed to be lower, and thus less
	meriting of Category 1 status than (for instance) a
	UK-only site that has never had to consider the
	DSA, or a global site that excludes UK users from
	the protective changes it has made to its services
	for EU DSA compliance purposes.
	Note that EU DSA VLOP status applies
	based purely on usercount data, so it would be
	wrong and potentially damaging to assume that a

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service that has "Very Large Online Platform (VLOP) status under the DSA is automatically so risky that it should get Category 1 status under the UK OSB. This is also because UK OSB Category 1 obligations go beyond those imposed by DSA VLOP status, and there must therefore be tighter criteria around Category 1 designation, in order to maintain proportionality.

Collaboratively-edited community content

Category 1 status for a site like Wikipedia would have enormous consequences, because of the obligations that would then flow from that status. As discussed above, Category 1 status should not apply to sites (or parts thereof) where content moderation *depends* on interaction by non-verified users. It also should not apply if Category 1-specific content visibility duties would cover content that has multiple authors.

For example, the Clause 15 user empowerment "duty to include in a service features which adult users may use or apply if they wish to filter out non-verified users" would be extraordinarily problematic for something like Wikipedia. Any given sentence of any given Wikipedia article might have been edited (in whole, or in parts as small as a single letter), by dozens, hundreds or even thousands of users around over the last 20+ years. They could blt would therefore be senseless for Category 1 status to apply in respect of parts of a U2U platform whose content has multiple different authors; the platform cannot reasonably show only the parts of a sentence or word that happened to be posted by a "verified" user.

Categorisation criteria should therefore prevent Category 1 status applying to parts of platforms

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	hosting collaboratively-edited content.
Question 9: Do you have evidence of factors that may affect how content that is illegal or harmful to children is disseminated on U2U services? • Are there particular function- alities that play a key role in enabling content that is ille- gal or harmful to children to be disseminated on U2U ser- vices? • Do you have evidence relat- ing to the relationship be- tween user numbers, func- tionalities and how content that is illegal or harmful to children is disseminated on U2U services?	Confidential? – N As peers from across the political spectrum have pointed out, Wikipedia poses little risk to chil- dren compared to the commercial platforms that the OSB was meant to target. To be sure, Baroness Ki- dron identified Wikipedia as a service that is <u>"inher- ently in a child's best interest."</u> Wikimedia free knowledge projects are im- portant resources through which children across the UK exercise and access their rights by sharing knowledge and gaining media literacy in any num- ber of languages, not only in English (see discus- sion of Welsh Wikipedia in the response to Question 3). Additionally, Wikimedia UK regularly works with schools and universities to put on <u>classroom</u> <u>education activities</u> , teaching students how to con- tribute to Wikipedia and educating them about how information is shared and spread online. These pro- grams were designed with <u>digital literacy skills</u> de- velopment in mind, and help students to better exer- cise their writing, research, and critical thinking skills while navigating content online. <u>Limited Purpose and Scope</u> Wikipedia and the other Wikimedia projects are structured in a way that does not allow users to post whatever they want—they are designed for specific purposes, and the guidelines that govern the projects enforce the projects' primary purposes.

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	online encyclopaedia. User-generated content that
	is not encyclopaedic in nature, and not neutral and
	reliably sourced according to rules set by the volun-
	teer editor community does not belong, and will be
	removed as being out of scope and inappropriate
	for the website.
	Since Wikipedia is organised around a sin-
	gular goal, the construction and maintenance of an
	online encyclopaedia, the types of potential harm on
	the platform are different than on most social media
	platforms. Further, they present less risk of potential
	harm to users and to the internet ecosystem more
	generally. The Wikimedia projects are totally free to
	use, and we aim for it to stay that way in perpetuity.
	Unlike some commercial platforms, there are no
	subscription models or multi-tiered memberships on
	our projects. Further, users cannot monetise the in-
	formational content they post or their use of the ser-
	vice, thereby reducing the incentives that exist on
	other platforms to share click-bait or other viral con-
	tent.
	The ethos of being a free culture project also
	often disincentivizes posting illegal content on the
	Wikimedia projects. For example, Wikimedia Com-
	mons, our free image repository, often removes
	copyrighted content even if there may be other legal
	exceptions or justifications for hosting the content.
	Effective moderation policies & practices
	The Wikimedia Movement's approach to ad-
	dressing potentially harmful or illegal content has
	been tailored over years of community and organi-
	sational practice to promote fairness and minimise
	harm. This necessarily involves close collaboration
	between volunteer moderators and professional
	trust and safety staff. The Wikimedia volunteer com-
	munity also enforce project-specific policies which

Question	Your response
	address illegal content, <u>like these from English Wik- ipedia</u> . As previously mentioned, <u>researchers</u> found that the median amount of time harmful content re- mained on English language Wikipedia was 61 sec- onds , and that Wikipedia's system of identifying and removing harmful content is largely effective. There are certain situations which cannot be handled by volunteers and are escalated to the Wikimedia Foundation trust & safety <u>emergency response</u> <u>team</u> to address (i.e., CSAM or TVEC). This type of escalation is possible because of the trusted rela- tionship between the Foundation and the volunteer administrators who maintain the Wikimedia projects. Outside of the circumstances described above, the Foundation believes that the open, partic- ipatory content governance on sites like Wikipedia guarantees that what is on the project serves socially useful purposes. Changing that balance, by forcing the platform to dictate policy, then on a day-to-day basis monitor, assess, categorise, and selectively or wholly deny access to content, fundamentally changes that dynamic, leads to editor attrition, and thus harms the very thing that makes these projects functional, relevant, and socially useful. And further undermines the primary purpose and core function of Wikipedia: a freely available and widely-accessible online encyclopaedia that is not age-gated or cen- sored based on the age of the person holding the vol-
Question 10: Do you have evidence of other objective and measurable char- acteristics that may be relevant to category 2B threshold conditions?	ume. Confidential? – N The criteria for 2B categorisation should be very clear and tightly-scoped, particularly because it will require increased resources expenditures by both the covered platforms and the regulator. The <u>latest amendments to Category 1 thresholds</u> sug- gest that tiny-but-risky sites can now be Category 1, which logically means that Category 2B services are

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not expected to be particularly risky—the OSB generally does not require 2B services to take extra protective measures.

As stated in our response to Question 8, in addition to user numbers and functionalities, Ofcom must consider the following in its categorisation criteria: the platform's mission (public interest v.s. profit); governance model (bottom-up, community governance v.s. top-down, centralised); resourcing and sustainability.

Public interest platforms (PIPs) like online encyclopaedias and libraries should be exempted from categorization—regardless of the number of users that access them, because their mission and core function is to provide the public with access to diverse and reliable sources of educational content and information. Wikipedia and other Wikimedia projects are designed to make information easily accessible and *freely* available. As previously mentioned, unlike some commercial platforms, there are no payment interfaces, subscription or tiered membership models, or monetization features of any kind, either in-app or on the websites on any of the Wikimedia projects.

The reality is that the Wikimedia Foundation, as a global nonprofit supported by charitable donations, has a very small legal team that is already stretched thin working on: <u>complying with the UK</u> and EU GDPR (and UK Data Protection Act, plus all its related legislation), and the EU DSA; navigating growing regulatory uncertainty in the United States, the jurisdiction where we are headquartered; and, trying to <u>defend the volunteer community and their</u> <u>efforts</u> from attacks by a range of private actors and governments hostile to free knowledge — to mention but a few major concerns. We do not have a single UK-based staff member whose job is specifi-

Question	Your response
	cally devoted to regulatory compliance or govern-
	ment relations there. Even keeping up with OFCOM
	consultations and developments in this area, will be
	a major stretch.
	Other entities who run PIPs, from FixMyStreet to
	the Heritage Alliance, are equally worried about the
	threat posed by the OSB to PIPs, and to UK society,
	more broadly, and the Lords heard them when they
	expressed their concerns. We urge OFCOM and the
	Secretary of State to use the powers and discretion
	afforded to them to the fullest possible extent, to
	preserve and protect this important sector, and al-
	low regulatory supervision to focus on the clearest
	sources of risk online. Categorisation criteria are
	one area for discretion, but less effective than the
	use of Secretary of State powers, as <u>advertised by</u>
	Lord Parkinson himself, to add service categories to
	Schedule 1 of the Bill.

Please complete this form in full and return to <u>os-cfe@ofcom.org.uk</u>.